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ACRONYMS
ccTLD

country code top-level domain

DNS

Domain Name System

IANA

Internet Assigned Numbers Authority

ICANN

Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers

ICDR

International Centre for Dispute Resolution

ICG

IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination
Group

IRP Panel

Independent Review Process Panel

MoU

memorandum of understanding

NIC

Network Information Center

NTIA

National Telecommunications and
Information Administration

TLD

top-level domain

USC

University of Southern California

INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the upcoming Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) transition,
wherein the US government will relinquish its historic
control over key technical functions making up the
modern-day Internet. The chapter’s most important
questions are: if the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN), the current IANA
functions operator, is no longer accountable to the US
government, then who should it be accountable to? And
what form should that accountability take?
The existing contractual arrangement between ICANN and
the US government contains more than simple contractual
terms. Rather, many of those contractual obligations
actually make up the core tenets of contemporary
multi-stakeholder governance, such as:
• ICANN cannot assign the IANA functions to someone
else;
• ICANN must operate as a multi-stakeholder, private
sector-led organization with input from the public;
• the need to ensure quality performance of the IANA
functions; and
• the existence of important contractual requirements
regarding the continuity of operations.

The fact is that the Internet has become too important
and too global for any one state to exercise exclusive
control — even historic control. Thus, the United States
unilaterally giving up its historic contractual stewardship
is laudable. There is a significant debate, however, about
what structure should take its place — with one extreme
arguing for a new international organization created by
civil society, and the other extreme arguing for centralized
state control under the auspices of the United Nations
International Telecommunication Union.
This chapter does not engage in that debate. Rather, it
seeks to advance a credible solution based on real-world
facts, existing legal rules and prevailing political realities.
It advances a balanced option that could work based on
existing constraints, including the rapidly approaching
deadline for the transition and the more primary concern
of maintaining the stability of the system during the
transition period (and beyond). In advancing this option,
this chapter argues that the existing core contractual
requirements imposed by the US government could
be migrated to the existing IANA functions customers.
This would ensure that the core tenets of contemporary
multi-stakeholder Internet governance are built into the
DNA of the governance regime going forward. It may
also go a long way to preserving (and even enhancing) the
multi-stakeholder system itself. It would create one-to-one
accountability between the organization delivering the
IANA service and the customers of that service.
The chapter also advances modest internal accountability
revisions that could be undertaken within ICANN’s
existing structure, in order to increase legitimacy within
the broader Internet community and to enhance existing
corporate governance. To that end, it argues that the
independence of the Independent Review Tribunal, charged
with taking an impartial, sober second assessment of
certain ICANN board of directors-related decisions, could
be increased by allowing the judges (arbitrators) that sit on
the panel to be selected by a multi-stakeholder committee
rather than being subject to approval by ICANN. Second,
that the existing grounds of review could be expanded,
allowing the tribunal — when warranted — to hear
additional cases on a broader range of complaints. In this
vein, this chapter adopts the conclusions from ICANN’s
own “Improving Institutional Confidence” process in
2008-2009. This process recommended that a new
Independent Review Tribunal be established with powers
to review the exercise of decision-making powers of the
ICANN board under four general rubrics: fairness, fidelity
to the power, cogency of decision making and addressing
the public interest (ICANN 2009a).1 This new tribunal
could be drawn from a standing panel of internationally
recognized relevant technical experts, as well as
1 The public interest rubric is an added provision by the authors, and
reflects general provisions in ICANN’s bylaws.
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internationally recognized jurists, including persons with
senior appellate judge experience (ibid.). This chapter also
argues that members of ICANN’s various stakeholder
groups and the public be able to make comments on the
proposed bench before final appointment.

BACKGROUND ON THE IANA
TRANSITION
The US Department of Commerce’s National
Telecommunications and Information Administration
(NTIA) has officially announced its intention to transition
key Internet domain name functions to the global
multi-stakeholder community (see NTIA 2014). In response,
ICANN, the current IANA functions operator, is convening
with various stakeholders to develop the transition plan.
This consultative process has led to the formation of
the IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group
(ICG), which is comprised of 30 individuals representing
13 direct and indirect stakeholder communities. This group
is charged with advancing a plan that would facilitate
the transition of these key domain name functions. This
transition would end the primary oversight role for the
US government in the function and maintenance of the
core technical functions implicated in the operation of the
Internet.
The IANA functions are a set of different technical tasks
that are foundational for the operation of the Internet,
functions over which the US government currently
maintains an oversight or stewardship role.2 At their
base, the IANA functions are a set of activities that offer
a “coordination service for the upper-most level Internet
identifiers. These functions work to ensure the secure,
stable, and reliable allocation, assignment, and distribution
of those identifiers, their uniqueness with respect to a
well-defined identifier space, and the recording of to
whom and/or for what purpose they are assigned”
(ICANN 2014b, 6). One of these key stewardship functions
is the oversight of changes to the authoritative root zone file
(see IANA 2014).3 The root zone file is the database that
allows the Internet to function — acting as a global address
book for data — containing an authoritative list of the
names and Internet protocol addresses of all top-level
domains.

2 For an excellent summary on the history of the IANA functions and
the role of the US government, see ICANN (2014b).
3 According to IANA (2014), “[its] functions are a set of interdependent
technical functions that enable the continued efficient operation of
the Internet. The IANA functions include: (1) the coordination of the
assignment of technical Internet protocol parameters; (2) the processing
of change requests to the authoritative root zone file of the DNS [Domain
Name System] and root key signing key...management; (3) the allocation
of Internet numbering resources; and (4) other services related to the
management of the ARPA and INT top-level domains [TLDs].”

Initially, the IANA functions were performed under a
contract between an agency of the US government (the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) and the
University of Southern California (USC), as part of a major
research project. From the early 1970s, IANA assigned the
Internet protocol address numbers, while the Network
Information Center (NIC) at the Stanford Research
Institute published them to the rest of the network. In
1990, this changed with the US Department of Defense
awarding the NIC functions to Government Systems,
Inc., which subcontracted it to the small private sector
firm Network Solutions Inc. By 1992, with much of the
Internet outside the US military, contracting authority for
these publishing functions was accumulated under the
US National Science Foundation, which awarded the NIC
functions to Network Solutions Inc., and related directory
and database services to AT&T. As this contract neared
expiry in 1999, it became clear that the stable performance
of the IANA and NIC functions were “vital to the stability
and correct functioning of the Internet” (NTIA 2012, C.1.2).
This led to the white paper process, which resulted in the
formation of a multi-stakeholder organization, ICANN, to
coordinate these functions. The initial contract to provide
the services to perform the operation of the IANA was
concluded between the US Department of Commerce and
ICANN on February 8, 2000 (NTIA 2000). The publishing
function was restructured under a Cooperative Research
and Development Agreement between the US Department
of Commerce and Verisign (which had bought Network
Solutions Inc. in 2000). This contractual arrangement has
continued, and it is the US government’s willingness
to relinquish its contractual authority over the IANA
functions that provides the primary mechanism for ending
its oversight role.
However, this announcement has led to the conflation
of two different issues. The first is the actual technical
administration of the IANA functions, which is not an
issue at all. In fact, a 2013 IANA functions customer
satisfaction survey indicated that there were extremely
high satisfaction levels among customers for these services
(Vegoda 2013). The second, and more nuanced, issue is that
the US government’s decision to relinquish its contractual
authority over the IANA functions has exposed a broader
question about ICANN’s accountability. In its most basic
form, the questions being asked are if ICANN is no longer
accountable to the US government for the IANA functions
through contract, then to which organization or community
should ICANN be accountable and what form should that
accountability take? This seemingly simple question has
generated much confusion and political discussion.
It is worth making an important distinction here about
the history of ICANN’s accountability relations with the
United States government since its inception. Initially,
there were two established mechanisms of accountability.
The first was the IANA procurement contract, which is
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discussed later. The second was the memorandum of
understanding (MoU) process by which the US Department
of Commerce worked with the board and management
of the new ICANN to ensure that it developed as was
envisaged in the 1998 US white paper that had called for
the establishment of a multi-stakeholder, not-for-profit
entity to carry out the functions previously performed
by US government agencies (ICANN 2000). In particular,
the MoU process sought to ensure that ICANN “has
the capability and resources to assume the important
responsibilities related to the technical management
of the DNS. To secure these assurances, the Parties…
will jointly design, develop, and test the mechanisms,
methods, and procedures that should be in place and the
steps necessary to transition management responsibility
for DNS functions now performed by, or on behalf of, the
U.S. Government to [ICANN]. Once testing is successfully
completed, it is contemplated that management of the
DNS will be transitioned to the mechanisms, methods,
and procedures designed and developed in the DNS
Project” (ICANN 1999). In practice, the development was
undertaken by the ICANN community and embedded in
its bylaws, procedures, organizational structure and policy
development processes. ICANN submitted 13 reports to
the US Department of Commerce until 2006, when the
MoU process was amended to a final three-year Joint
Project Agreement. In its conclusion, the US Department
of Commerce formally recognized ICANN as the body
envisaged in the white paper and the two parties made
a detailed statement of responsibilities to the broader
Internet community. This Affirmation of Commitments
agreement replaced the US Department of Commerce with
an international and multi-stakeholder mechanism from
within the Internet community that outlined ICANN’s
commitment to:

Further confusion is created by the fact that some have
failed to recognize the distinction between accountability
for performing the IANA functions on the one hand, and
accountability for broad policy decisions related to the DNS
on the other; these are not the same thing. The Department of
Commerce has made it clear that it sees the latter covered by
the Affirmation of Commitments and ICANN’s other similar
frameworks. With respect to accountability for the former,
one possible approach could be that the relevant provisions
that rendered ICANN accountable to the US government for
the performance of these functions and the necessary service
standards, could simply be migrated from the contracts
with the Department of Commerce to the contracts between
ICANN and its IANA services customers. In this regard,
ICANN would then be accountable to its customers through
the law of contract for the functions and services performed
on its behalf.

• enhance the operational stability, reliability,
resiliency, security and global interoperability
of the DNS; and

A simple two-way equal accountability to the “customers”
or “partners” of the IANA functions, however, does have
its limitations. In certain circumstances, the exercise
of the IANA functions requires an exercise of superior
power. The three clearest examples are the recognition
of a new TLD, the re-delegation of an existing TLD from
one administrator to another and the recognition of a
new regional Internet registry. While upward community
policies have been developed through the ICANN
multi-stakeholder processes, building on earlier Internet
community documents, such as the Internet Engineering
Task Force’s RFC 1591 (drafted by Jon Postel in 1994),5 to
establish the processes ICANN must follow to exercise
this power,6 circumstances require on occasions that
the IANA function be exercised contrary to the narrow
interests of an existing “partner.” The cause célèbre of this
is a “hostile re-delegation” of a country code TLD (ccTD).
The need for IANA to be able to act to implement the
re-delegation process is recognized in various ways in the
existing accountability agreements between ICANN and
84 ccTLDs.7

• promote competition, consumer trust and
consumer choice, especially in domain
names, and commit to enforcing its existing
policy relating to WHOIS, subject to
applicable laws. (ICANN 2009b)

Consequently, this chapter proposes that, as well as
accountability of performance of the IANA processes
through the contracts or exchange of letters that ICANN
has with its IANA services customers, there should also
be a form of administrative review through appeal to the

• ensure accountability, transparency and the
interests of global Internet users;

Despite the widely well-received Affirmation of Commitments,4
at least part of the international Internet and political
communities saw (and in many cases welcomed) the
continuance of the IANA procurement contract as an added
political patina: that the US government would continue as a
critical political backstop against threats to Internet stability,
and in this conception ICANN is — at least theoretically —
4

accountable to the administration of the US government
through the IANA contract.

See https://archive.icann.org/en/affirmation/affirmation-reaction.htm.

5 Jon Postel originated the IANA function at USC and continued to
perform the function until the task became too demanding, leading to the
US government’s white paper process in 1998.
6 See
www.icann.org/resources/pages/background-2012-02-25-en;
www.icann.org/resources/pages/global-addressing-2012-02-25-en;
www.icann.org/resources/pages/new-rirs-criteria-2012-02-25-en; and
www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1591.txt.
7

See www.icann.org/resources/pages/cctlds-2012-02-25-en.
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type of review panel proposed later in the chapter. This
will allow parties affected by this exercise of “superior
power” to have recourse to review the fidelity of the
process followed by ICANN.

“accountability” actually means in this context, or on how
ICANN’s broader accountability mechanisms could be
strengthened in the absence of a contractual relationship
with the US government.

Accountability for policy decisions is ab initio more
complex. Nevertheless, when engaging in discussions
surrounding ICANN’s accountability in the broader
sense, it is important not to lose sight of three critical facts.
First, ICANN already has in place a number of internal
and external mechanisms related to accountability
for policy decisions. Second, at present, the US
government has not, nor is likely to, intervene in the
decision-making process within ICANN, making this
portion of the existing accountability relationship
largely symbolic.8 Third, the US government made clear
at ICANN’s Town Hall Meeting at the 2014 Internet
Governance Forum that the discussion around enhancing
ICANN’s accountability mechanisms should be narrowly
focused on those related to the IANA functions. In
this way, it now seems unequivocal that there is no
open invitation to discuss major institutional change.
Rather, when determining whether it will relinquish its
contractual authority, the US government is interested only
in narrowly articulated issues of accountability insofar as
they relate to ICANN’s contractual relationship with the
US government.

To clear up the definitional ambiguity, this chapter
employs a two-part definition of accountability. The
first involves accountability for performance, meaning
that the IANA functions are being performed promptly,
efficiently and professionally. As a core piece of global
critical infrastructure, one of the IANA accountabilities is
that its processes and operations are effective 24/7/365.
The second part adopts the definition put forward by Ruth
W. Grant and Robert O. Keohane (2005) and assumes that
accountability “functions to expose and sanction two sorts
of abuses: the unauthorized or illegitimate exercise of power
and decisions that are judged by accountability holders to
be unwise or unjust.” Thus, in order to be accountable in
the absence of the traditional contractual relationship with
the US government, there must be some other mechanism
that can function to ensure high performance standards
and that can sanction unauthorized or illegitimate actions
or inactions on the part of ICANN in its performance of the
IANA functions.

In addition to the constraint on the substantive elements
of the accountability review, there are a number of other
conditions that must be met in order for the transition plan
to be accepted by the NTIA. The NTIA has indicated in
no uncertain terms that to be accepted, the transition plan
must:
• have broad community support;
• support and enhance the multi-stakeholder model;
• maintain the security, stability and resiliency of the
Internet DNS;
• meet the needs of global customers for the IANA
services;

EXTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY:
CONTRACTUAL MIGRATION OF
CORE REQUIREMENTS FOR IANA
FUNCTIONS
THE IANA FUNCTIONS CONTRACT
The IANA functions contract between the US Department
of Commerce and ICANN includes a number of extremely
important provisions, which are principled and sensible
mechanisms, and which are now deeply engrained in
the structure of contemporary Internet governance.
However, the absence of a contractual obligation to the US
government for these provisions could undermine their
legal footing.

Currently, there is no consensus on an institutional
framework that can meet these six necessary conditions.
There is also no consensus on what the word

As an example, the IANA functions contract creates
important obligations regarding how ICANN relates
to affected parties. Under the existing contract, ICANN
is obliged to develop a close constructive working
relationship with all interested and affected parties to
ensure quality and satisfactory performance of the IANA
functions (NTIA 2012, C.1.3). ICANN is also prohibited
from subcontracting or assigning the required services to
another entity (ibid., C.2.1).

8 According to Lawrence Strickling in a letter to Neelie Kroes titled
“re: dot-xxx” on April 20, 2011: “While the Obama Administration
does not support ICANN’s decision, we respect the multistakeholder
Internet governance process and do not think that it is in the long-term
best interest of the United States or the global Internet community for us
unilaterally to reverse the decision” (Kruger 2014).

With respect to the establishment and collection of fees
from the IANA functions customers, there is a contractual
requirement to ensure that the fee levels are fair and
reasonable, and that any proposed fee structure would
be based on the cost of providing the specific service in
question (ibid., C.2.3). There is also a requirement to treat

• maintain the openness of the Internet; and
• not replace the NTIA role with a government-led or
an intergovernmental organizational solution.
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each of the IANA functions with equal priority, and process
all requests promptly and efficiently (C.2.4).
More generally, there are requirements to develop and
implement performance standards (C.2.8), to process root
zone file changes as expeditiously as possible (C.2.9.2.a)
and to create a process for IANA functions customers to
submit complaints for the timely resolution of disputes
(C.2.9.2.g). The contract also creates security requirements
(C.3), establishes a need for performance measures and
metrics, creates a requirement to avoid conflicts of interest
(C.6) and produces a robust set of requirements regarding
continuity of operations (C.7).

THE AFFIRMATION OF COMMITMENTS
In the event of the US government relinquishing its IANA
contract, any inferred enforcement mechanism for ICANN
compliance with the Affirmation of Commitments will
cease. The Affirmation is a contract that creates both rights
and obligations for ICANN. The unilateral decision of the
US government to remove itself from one of the central
positions in Internet governance has also created an
uncertain basis for the Affirmation. This is problematic
because it contains some of the core tenets of contemporary
Internet governance. This document includes a
commitment to ensure that decisions made that are related
to the global technical coordination of the DNS are made
in the public interest and are accountable and transparent.
The Affirmation also requires ICANN to: preserve the
security, stability and resiliency of the DNS; promote
competition, consumer trust and consumer choice in the
DNS marketplace; and facilitate international participation
in DNS technical coordination (ICANN 2009b).
These are incredibly powerful commitments, which
echo some of the key tenets of Internet governance. The
Affirmation also requires ICANN to “ensure that its
decisions are in the public interest, and not just the interests
of a particular set of stakeholders” (ibid., paragraph 4). In
order to achieve this, ICANN is required to perform and
publish analyses of the “positive and negative effects of
its decisions on the public, including any financial impact
on the public, and the positive or negative impact (if any)
on the systemic security, stability and resiliency of the
DNS” (ibid.). Pursuant to the Affirmation, ICANN also
commits to:
• adhere to transparent and accountable budgeting
processes;
• fact-based policy development and cross-community
deliberations;
• responsive consultation procedures that provide
detailed explanations of the basis for decisions,
including how comments have influenced the
development of policy considerations;

• publish each year an annual report that sets out
ICANN’s progress against ICANN’s bylaws,
responsibilities, and strategic and operating plans;
• provide a thorough and reasoned explanation of
decisions taken, the rationale thereof, and the sources
of data and information on which ICANN relied; and
• operate as a multi-stakeholder, private sector-led
organization with input from the public, for whose
benefit ICANN shall in all events act. (ibid.)
In reviewing the commitments undertaken in the
Affirmation, it is clear that they are more than basic
contractual functions. Rather, they are parts of the core
fabric of the current model of governance, as seen with
the examples of the commitment to operate as a multistakeholder institution with input from the public
and the requirement to act in the public’s interest.
With the absence of a contractual obligation to the
US government for these foundational principles, the
transition plan should seek to incorporate external
mechanisms for preserving them. One credible way of
doing this is to migrate the contractual obligations now
found in the IANA services contract and the Affirmation
into contracts with the IANA functions customers.
Another is to bolster the existing legal responsibility of
the ICANN board to operate according to its mission
and core values (which include many of the Affirmation
of Commitments details).9 Such bolstering could come
9 ICANN’s existing legal framework establishes some administrative
law requirements: first, under the California Corporations Code
provisions for not-for-profit, public benefit corporations; and second,
under common law. ICANN’s directors are required under the California
Code to implement the purposes outlined in its Articles of Incorporation:
“of lessening the burdens of government and promoting the global public
interest in the operational stability of the Internet by (i) coordinating
the assignment of Internet technical parameters as needed to maintain
universal connectivity on the Internet; (ii) performing and overseeing
functions related to the coordination of the Internet Protocol (“IP”)
address space; (iii) performing and overseeing functions related to the
coordination of the Internet domain name system (“DNS”), including the
development of policies for determining the circumstances under which
new top-level domains are added to the DNS root system; (iv) overseeing
operation of the authoritative Internet DNS root server system; and (v)
engaging in any other related lawful activity in furtherance of items
(i) through (iv)….The Corporation shall operate for the benefit of the
Internet community as a whole, carrying out its activities in conformity
with relevant principles of international law and applicable international
conventions and local law and, to the extent appropriate and consistent
with these Articles and its Bylaws, through open and transparent
processes that enable competition and open entry in Internet-related
markets. To this effect, the Corporation shall cooperate as appropriate
with relevant international organizations” (ICANN 1998).
The board members are accountable to these purposes, and the California
Code empowers the Attorney General of California to intervene in the
organization if they are breached. Further, a director of a non-profit public
benefit corporation owes, under common law, a duty of care to the entity.
It is required that the director take reasonable measures to ensure that
the organization is managed and directed in a manner that is consistent
with its mission. For details of how this imposes public interest duties
on the directors, see www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/acct-transframeworks-principles-10jan08-en.pdf.
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through the augmented adoption of a proposal put forward
by ICANN’s Improving Institutional Confidence process
in 2008-2009: the establishment of a new Independent
Review Tribunal with powers to review the exercise of
decision-making powers of the ICANN board under four
general rubrics — fairness, fidelity to the power, cogency
of decision making and addressing the public interest
(ICANN 2009a).

MIGRATING THE CORE CONTRACTUAL
REQUIREMENTS
Given the foundational nature of the core commitments
found within both the Affirmation and the IANA functions
contract, any regime adopted to facilitate the transition
should seek to enshrine them in the future governance
structure. These requirements should be enumerated in
a way that renders ICANN externally accountable for
performance standards and exposed to sanction for abuses
or for behaving in a manner that runs contrary to these
commitments. In order to achieve this going forward, the
core commitments found within both the Affirmation and
the IANA functions contract could be migrated through
the law of contract into individualized service agreements
with IANA services customers. As a procedural matter, it
would also be permissible to migrate these foundational
principles into a collective services agreement between
ICANN and all IANA services customers, leaving the
individualized contracts to address matters unique to
ICANN and the individual customer in question.
On the most important tenets, it may even be advisable to
draft a clause favouring specific performance as a remedy.
Specific performance is a remedy that allows a court to
require a party to perform a particular act, as an alternative
to monetary damages. This would create a hard external
accountability check, with a meaningful remedy provision,
held directly by those organizations most affected by a
particular decision, action or inaction.

INTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY:
FURTHER SUPPORTING ICANN’S
EXISTING STRUCTURE
ICANN is organized as a non-profit public benefit
corporation under the California Nonprofit Public
Benefit Corporations law. Under this framework, ICANN
(1998, paragraph 4) is designed to operate “for the benefit
of the Internet community as a whole” according to its
Articles of Incorporation. Articles of Incorporation are
considered to be the constitutional documents of any
corporate structure and it is impermissible for either
management of the corporation or the directors to behave
in a manner that runs counter to the articles or the purposes
articulated in that document. In this respect, at least some
of the foundational governance principles found in the
Affirmation are already part of the ICANN corporate

structure. There are, however, several limited internal
governance revisions, which could further increase
accountability, while not adding an additional onerous
administrative burden.
The existing governance structure of ICANN includes a
number of mechanisms to ensure accountability within
its operations.10 However, this chapter only examines the
process for reconsideration and internal review of decisions
of the ICANN board of directors, and the external and
independent review of board decisions.

ACCOUNTABILITY AND REVIEW
Pursuant to the bylaws, there is a mechanism under
which a party aggrieved by a decision of ICANN staff or
the board may request reconsideration or review of that
decision. To that end, the bylaws provide that any person
may submit a request for reconsideration or review, if they
have been adversely affected by:
“a. one or more staff actions or inactions that
contradict established ICANN policy(ies); or
b. one or more actions or inactions of the
ICANN Board that have been taken or
refused to be taken without consideration of
material information, except where the party
submitting the request could have submitted,
but did not submit, the information for the
Board’s consideration at the time of action or
refusal to act; or
c. one or more actions or inactions of the
ICANN Board that are taken as a result of
the Board’s reliance on false or inaccurate
material information.” (ICANN 2014a,
Article IV, section 2, paragraph 2)
The Board Governance Committee reviews and considers
these reconsideration requests. For all reconsideration
requests involving staff, the Board Governance Committee
has delegated authority to make a final determination.
In practice, the Board Governance Committee makes a
recommendation to the board, including a resolution,
which the board typically adopts. With respect to board
decisions, the bylaws provide that the “Board shall not
be bound to follow the recommendations of the Board
Governance Committee….The Board’s decision on the
recommendation is final” (ibid., paragraph 17). This is a
reflection of Californian and US federal law, which stress
that boards cannot delegate away their final accountability.
In this way, reconsideration is permissible if information

10 There are a number of mechanisms that would fit under the broad
heading of accountability that will not be considered here. These include,
but are not limited to, bylaw requirements for transparency, information
disclosure and financial accountability, including external audits.
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was lacking at the time the impugned decision was made,
or the decision runs contrary to established policy.
This provision could be strengthened by adding an
additional substantive ground of reconsideration —
allowing a reconsideration request to go forward if an
aggrieved party alleges that a decision was undertaken in a
manner that runs contrary to the public interest. Adding a
public interest ground for reconsideration requests would
add an additional level of assurance that decisions are
being undertaken in a manner that adequately considers
the implications of those decisions on the interests of the
broader public. This will inevitably require weighing
various interests, which may at times be conflicting.
Nevertheless, if an aggrieved party can allege a prima facie
breach of the public interest (recognizing that a working
definition of “public interest” will need to be articulated),
then a substantive ground of reconsideration on this basis
would strengthen the existing governance structure.

INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF BOARD ACTIONS
There is also a separate process for independent thirdparty review of board actions that are alleged to be
inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or bylaws.
In these cases, an Independent Review Process Panel (IRP
Panel) will be established. Pursuant to the bylaws, the IRP
Panel must apply a defined standard of review, focusing
on the following:
“a. did the Board act without conflict of interest
in taking its decision?;
b. did the Board exercise due diligence and care
in having a reasonable amount of facts in
front of them?; and
c. did the Board members exercise independent
judgment in taking the decision, believed
to be in the best interests of the company?”
(ibid., section 3, paragraph 4)
As a starting point, in order to strengthen the existing
governance structure, the standard of review should
be broadened. The current narrowly defined standard
will allow review only in the event of a decision made
based on a conflict of interest, a lack of diligence or
lack of independence. In order to assuage some of the
community’s concerns regarding accountability, just like
with the reconsideration of decisions noted above, the
standard could be broadened to specifically incorporate
independent review on the grounds that a decision was
taken in a manner that runs contrary to the public interest.
This is already being done in a somewhat roundabout way.
The board is obliged to undertake decisions that they
believe to be in the best interest of the company, which

are in turn based on a corporate fiduciary duty,11 and
those decisions must be in accordance with the Articles of
Incorporation. The Articles of ICANN specifically articulate
a need for operations that benefit the Internet community
as a whole. Thus, there is already a mechanism through
which at least a portion of the public interest would be
considered, though the Internet community is a narrower
subset of the public — which would include individuals
who have yet to use the Internet. However, specifically
incorporating a ground of review based on overall public
interest would also serve to reinforce the existing review
structure and buttress existing accountability mechanisms.
The existing grounds of review could be further expanded
along the lines articulated in the Improving Institutional
Confidence to include review on the grounds of fairness,
fidelity and rationality. Grounds of fairness would allow
review surrounding the integrity of the decision-making
process. A fidelity review would ensure that decisions were
untaken in a manner that was faithful to the “scope and
objects of the power being exercised.”12 A rationality review
would independently confirm or deny that decisions were
made in a cogent way, taking account of relevant evidence
and within the scope of authority. This would also be an
important step in implementing the NETmundial outcome
document, which specifically recognizes that “the Internet
is a global resource which should be managed in the public
interest” (NETmundial 2014, emphasis added). Setting out
a ground of review that recognizes this could garner a
good amount of community support.
On the procedural side, when an independent review
proceeding is brought, it is administered by an
international dispute resolution provider, which is
appointed by ICANN. In 2006, ICANN appointed the
International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR),
the international division of the American Arbitration

11 Directors are subject to certain fiduciary duties in carrying out their
governance responsibilities. One such obligation is often referred to as
the “duty of loyalty,” which places two separate legal requirements on
directors. The first is that the director act in good faith when conducting
the business of the corporation. The second is that the director continually
act in the best interests of the corporation, placing the interests of the
corporation above the interests of all others — including their own —
when making decisions. See ICM Registry, LLC, Claimant, v. Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”), Respondent,
Declaration of the Independent Review Panel, February 19, 2010,
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Dickran Tevrizian, at 74
(“Directors of non-profit corporations in California owe a fiduciary duty
to the corporation they serve and to its members, if any. See Raven’s Cove
Townhomes, Inc. v. Knuppe Dev. Co., (1981) 114 CA3d 783, 799; Burt v. Irvine
Co., (1965) 237 CA2nd 828, 852. See also, Harvey v. Landing Homeowners
Assn., (2008) 162 CA4th 809, 821-822.”). See also ICANN’s (2014a) Article
VI, Board of Directors, Section 7, Duties of Directors: “Directors shall
serve as individuals who have the duty to act in what they reasonably
believe are the best interests of ICANN and not as representatives of the
entity that selected them, their employers, or any other organizations or
constituencies.”
12 See https://archive.icann.org/en/jpa/iic/iic-the-way-forward-31
may09-en.pdf.
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Association, as the provider. The provider coordinates
the membership of the standing panel, subject to ICANN
approval. The ICDR’s rules give each party the right to
propose an arbitrator, with the third panellist selected
by the ICDR. The procedural rules for the settlement of
disputes are also subject to the approval of the ICANN
board. These arbitrations are also non-binding,13 although
the board has stated its intent to implement decisions of
these sorts of arbitrations.
The most problematic element is a lack of independence
between ICANN and the individuals appointed to hear
a dispute involving a decision taken by the board of that
organization. Section 3, paragraph 7 of ICANN’s bylaws
states that all IRP Panel proceedings be administered by
an international dispute resolution provider appointed
by ICANN (the IRP Panel provider). The membership of
the standing panel shall be coordinated by the provider,
subject to approval by ICANN (ICANN 2014). The
difficulty created by this potential lack of independence is
that the members of the arbitral panel could be beholden
to ICANN for their position on the panel. Realistically,
it is unlikely that an individual arbitrator would side
with ICANN in a dispute based on the fact that ICANN
approved their appointment to the standing roster of
arbitrators. Nevertheless, this process of confirming
appointments does raise the reasonable apprehension of a
lack of independence. In order to remedy this perceived
lack of independence, a standing committee comprised of
various stakeholder groups could be struck to oversee the
provider’s populating of the list of eligible arbitrators.
More substantially, the IRP Panel process could be replaced
by the Independent Review Tribunal recommended
by ICANN’s Improving Institutional Confidence
process. That process proposed that “the International
Dispute Resolution Provider name a standing panel of
internationally recognized relevant technical experts as
well as internationally recognized jurists, including persons
with senior appellate judge experience. The existence of a
known and recognized ‘bench’ of ‘judges’ will add to the
stature and authority of the Independent Review Panel.
The panel’s members should be appointed for either a set
period of five years or until they resign, whichever is the
earlier” (ICANN 2009a). This chapter proposes that the
members of ICANN’s various stakeholder groups and the
broader public be able to make comments on the proposed
bench before final appointment.

CONCLUSION
There are two major constraints on the implementation of
any proposed mechanism that can meet the enumerated
criteria set for any transition proposal. The first is time.
13 See ICM Registry, LLC, Claimant, v. Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (“ICANN”), Respondent, Declaration of the
Independent Review Panel, February 19, 2010.

The IANA functions contract expires in September 2015.
The announcement that the US government was prepared
to relinquish its contractual authority was made in March
2014. Based on this, the ICG has established a process
timeline for the generation of the transition proposal.
Under this process timeline, the first stage involves
affected communities developing their proposal text and
submitting that material to the ICG. The current deadline
for the submission of these materials is January 15, 2015,
leaving approximately nine months before the contract
expiry (or option commencement)14 period. This would
leave approximately nine months to review the various
proposals put forward by the community, synthesize a
draft response, receive and respond to feedback on the
draft proposal, ensure that the proposed system will
actually work, and then allow adequate time for the NTIA
to review and respond to the proposed structure.
The second constraint is scope. In addition to the
necessary conditions imposed on the transition proposal,
any proposed structure must also carry domestic political
support within the United States. The former Speaker of
the US House of Representatives Tip O’Neill once said,
“All politics is local.” The case of the IANA functions
transition is no different. Creating a system where the
various accountability mechanisms previously held by the
US government are held by the customers of the IANA
services could be the type of private sector response that
may carry domestic political support. Moreover, this form
of modest and measured approach may also be practicable
within the incredibly tight timelines associated with the
transition.
Engaging in the moderate redesign set out in this chapter
does not preclude the grand institutional bargain and
redesign that some favour at a future point. Many states and
groups within civil society are seeking a broad reimagining
of the way that the Internet is governed, with some even
calling existing structures illegitimate. Whether these
concerns are warranted or not, the fact is that undertaking a
measured approach now to the IANA transition would not
necessarily prevent or impede a larger negotiation about
institutional design and legitimacy. However, this could be
done in a staged manner, addressing issues of immediate
concern — such as the September 2015 deadline — with
the larger and more contentious issues left for resolution
without being imbued with a false sense of urgency.
Considering these constraints, this chapter recommends
the following steps to help improve the accountability of
the performance of the IANA functions by ICANN:

14 Pursuant to the IANA functions contract, the base period of
performance of this contract is from October 1, 2012 through September
30, 2015. However, there are two option periods, which — if exercised —
would extend the period of performance to September 30, 2019.
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• That the relevant provisions that rendered
ICANN accountable to the US government for the
performance of the IANA functions and the necessary
service standards be migrated from the contracts
with the Department of Commerce to the contracts
between ICANN and its IANA services customers.
In this regard, ICANN would be accountable to
its customers through the law of contract for the
functions and services performed on their behalf.
It would be advisable to include a clause favouring
specific performance as a remedy.
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